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COURTS AS CASINOS? AN EMPIRICAL
INVESTIGATION OF RANDOMNESS AND
EFFICIENCY IN CIVIL LITIGATION
EVAN OSBORNE*

Abstract
For a variety of reasons, the U.S. legal system has been accused of performing
poorly because of the haphazard way in which courts assess liability and award
damages. This article examines the relation of court awards to the pretrial expectations of litigants and their attorneys and to measurable, economically relevant damages. Court awards are highly predictable, as variance in expectations explains
much of the variance in awards. In addition, awards are significantly related to both
medical costs and property damage. The hypothesis of a highly unpredictable court
system is conclusively rejected.

I. Introduction

O
ne of the most common charges levied against the American civil litigation regime is that it is far too random. Critics of the system maintain
that court verdicts and awards are unpredictable and often unrelated to any
reasonable notion of fault, so that its alleged benefits, whether in terms of
economic efficiency or the rendering of justice, are overstated. The criticism is made not just by businesses1 and insurers,2 who might be expected
to harbor such sentiments, but by economists3 and legal scholars.4 Indeed,
one economist goes so far as to argue that certain empirical parameters of
the civil litigation system so closely resemble similar figures for state lot-

* Assistant professor of economics, Wright State University. I thank, without implicating,
both an anonymous referee and William M. Landes for very helpful assistance.
1
E. Patrick McGuire, The Impact of Product Liability (1988).
2
Clark Embler, Pollution and Liability, 8 Corp. Board 13 (1987).
3
Dick Netzer, On ‘‘Auto Choice,’’ Only the Lawyers Lose, letter, N.Y. Times, January
31, 1997; Robert E. Litan, Peter Swire, & Clifford Winston, The U.S. Liability System:
Background and Trends, in The Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability on Safety and Innovation (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds. 1991).
4
Christopher P. Bowers, Courts, Contracts and the Appropriate Discount Rate: A Quick
Fix for the Legal Lottery, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1099 (1996).
[Journal of Legal Studies, vol. XXVIII ( January 1999)]
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tery systems that the former is best understood as a purposefully constructed version of the latter.5
Despite widespread complaints about the liability lottery, there have been
no comprehensive attempts to measure the extent to which civil-court verdicts can be predicted. This article seeks to assess unpredictability and inefficiency in U.S. civil litigation by answering two questions. First, are verdicts and judgments predictable, so that rational litigants may anticipate
court behavior and react accordingly? And second, if so, to what extent are
differences in court awards related to differences in economically relevant
details of the case? The study will build on two previous strands of literature. The first is a series of studies, most involving medical malpractice, on
the relation between defendant conduct and lawsuit outcomes. Work by
Henry Farber and Michelle White, Patricia Danzon, and Frank Sloan and
Chee Ruey Hsieh shows that the chances of having a case dropped, the
chances of the plaintiff winning, and the amount he or she wins are correlated in the economically expected way with measures of defendant misconduct.6 However, a weakness of these studies is that they use only a few
discrete measures of defendant conduct and plaintiff harm. In the most thorough measure, Sloan and Hsieh employed variables for injury severity and
degree of defendant misconduct that took whole-number values from one to
eight. Elisabeth Landes found a significant relation between the continuous
variables of measurable economic loss and tort compensation, but her sample was confined to automobile-accident litigation, and her methods left
open the possibility that ‘‘tort compensation has some aspects of a lottery.’’ 7 This article will also use continuous measures of actual and expected damages but will do so for a wide variety of categories of law. It
will also for the first time make use of continuous measures of the expected
value of the lawsuit to litigants.
In addition, Theodore Eisenberg et al. recently assessed patterns in punitive damages and found that such damages are predictable and economically sensible.8 However, their test of sensibility was a comparison of puni-

5
William T. Harris, A Public Choice Analysis of the Evolution of Tort Law: Liabilities,
Lotteries and Redistribution, 51 Am. J. Econ. & Soc. 101 (1992).
6
Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, Medical Malpractice: An Empirical Investigation
of the Litigation Process, 22 Rand J. Econ. 199 (1991); Patricia Munch Danzon, Medical
Malpractice: Theory, Evidence and Public Policy (1985); Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey
Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation Fair? 24 Law &
Soc. Rev. 997 (1990).
7
Elisabeth M. Landes, Compensation for Automobile Accident Injuries: Is the Tort System Fair? 11 J. Legal Stud. 253, 256 (1981).
8
Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. Legal Stud.
623 (1997).
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tive to compensatory damages. Critically, they assumed that compensatory
damages are closely related to actual, economically relevant harm.9 There
is as yet no empirical support for this proposition, and although punitive
damages draw the headlines, compensatory damages are far more important
in the day-to-day functioning of the courts. This article thus investigates
whether all damages, punitive and compensatory, are related to harm and
to expectations about trial. Section II sets up the problem to be explained
and examines how predictable awards are, and Section III examines the relation between awards and economic fundamentals.
II. The Predictability of Awards
I will assume that the lawsuit is an exercise in rational choice under uncertainty, in the sense that effort is chosen so that the expected value of the
lawsuit is maximized, given that at least the outcome and perhaps even
the size of the award is uncertain.10 We might imagine that A, the award in
the event the suit proceeds all the way to final disposition, can be estimated
through its expected value E(A) ⫽ f (X ), and that the award itself is given
by A ⫽ f(X ) ⫹ u. The variable X is a set of exogenous variables, and u is
a random shock distributed according to some known density function
g(u | 0, σ 2 ). The variable X will include a large number of factors, including
but not limited to the facts of the case, the relevant law, the skill of each
attorney, and the history of the particular court with respect to procedural
issues or sympathy for plaintiffs or defendants.
The more that the variance in awards is related to variance in X, the
greater is the predictability of the court system. Economic analysis of litigation indicates that some unpredictability must exist, as trials result from litigants’ estimates of trial outcomes that are erroneous on at least one side.
Often these models produce equilibria in which a fraction of cases go to
trial depending on information that is unknown to both litigants at the time
they must decide whether to settle or go to trial, including different estimates of the stakes or of defendant fault by each litigant.11 Note that the
performance by the court system of the tasks assigned to it in the economic
model of litigation does not simply require that awards be substantially pre9
Eisenberg et al. state: ‘‘In tort cases eligible for punitive damages, a convenient measure
of the degree of harm caused by the defendant usually exists. The compensatory component
of the damages award should be a measure of the harm the defendant has caused.’’ Id. at
628.
10
A paper that is often credited as the first examination of litigation as a rational, optimizing investment is William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. Law &
Econ. 61 (1971).
11
Many papers are based on this belief. See, for example, George Priest & Benjamin
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1984).

190

THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

dictable. Awards should also be related to factors that contribute to social
welfare maximization, such as the efficient allocation of risk and, most important in the analysis below, the bearing of the relevant burdens by the
party that could have done so at least cost ex ante.
The null hypothesis is that awards by courts are so unpredictable as to
add great risk to market exchange. Greater unpredictability in court awards
means that insurance against the vagaries of the liability system is harder
to obtain, and producers may respond by avoiding any productive activity
that is sufficiently hampered by litigation risk. If awards are predictable,
then employers should be able to anticipate the sorts of circumstances that
will give rise to litigation and court-imposed penalties and to take action to
avoid those circumstances where it is efficient to do so. The high percentage of cases that settle out of court provides some evidence, admittedly tentative, that court awards are not as random as is sometimes claimed.12
The randomness hypothesis can be tested more concretely by measuring
the relation between court awards and ex ante expectations of those awards.
Such data are found in the Civil Litigation Research Project (CLRP). This
data set contains information that is a very close proxy for what representing attorneys thought the gross expected values of their cases were. Attorneys were asked, after the fact, the maximum amount their clients should
have accepted to settle the case. Of course, ex ante estimations would be
ideal, but there are two reasons to suppose that the stakes variable contained
in the report is an adequate approximation of f (X ). The first is that the researchers carefully designed an oral interview questionnaire to obtain precisely that answer from attorneys who were able to consult written records.13 Second, and more important, empirical work demonstrates that these
estimations were in fact an important predictor of eventual attorney effort
in the case, indicating that the ex post estimations were closely related to
ex ante optimizing behavior.14 The advantage of having this measure is that
with rational litigants it should capture all relevant information that can be
12
The evidence is tentative because even modest unpredictability could generate a high
rate of settlement if litigants are sufficiently risk averse.
13
The interviewer first asked the attorney, ‘‘At that time, what did you think should have
been done to settle the problem?’’ If no money figure was mentioned, the follow-up question
was, ‘‘Suppose that there could have been a settlement at that time which involved only a
lump sum payment of money. What would you think it should have been?’’ This information
comes from the data set codebook, Herbert M. Kritzer et al., Civil Litigation Research Project Data Archive Revision, 1988–81, at 21 (1987). The survey was not sufficiently detailed
to indicate which records were consulted in the creation of specific variables. However, it
does indicate that of 256 observations in the broadest sample used in the analysis (see Section
IIA infra), information on whether records were consulted in the interview was available in
212. They were used in 169.
14
David Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 72 (1983).
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TABLE 1
Description of Civil Litigation Research Project Data
A. Breakdown of Data Subsets

Data Subset
Full data set
Full sample
No outright defendant
victories
Judges
Juries

N

Number
of Cases

State
Court

Federal
Court

Unknown/
Other

N.A.
256

2,582
196

809
80

840
89

933
27

216
80
30

166
66
18

72
26
6

67
40
12

27
N.A.
N.A.

Minimum

Maximum

B. Summary Statistics (in Dollars)
Data Subset
Full data set:
AWARD
STAKES
Full sample:
AWARD
STAKES
No outright defendant
victories:
AWARD
STAKES
Judges:
AWARD
STAKES
Juries:
AWARD
STAKES

Mean

Median

SD

25,110
37,481

4,370
8,016

180,366
131,819

0
0

5,225,000
2,500,000

14,312
32,959

2,633
7,500

32,386
103,144

0
0

235,000
1,100,000

16,963
34,251

4,000
6,935

34,624
108,591

0
0

235,000
1,100,000

15,412
34,636

1,108
10,000

32,905
90,412

0
300

200,000
675,000

11,080
65,208

3,794
7,500

17,584
140,482

0
750

87,500
600,000

Note.—N.A. ⫽ not applicable.

obtained at a nonprohibitive cost. The use of expectations as the exogenous
variable thus has the useful feature of incorporating all the factors that such
litigants need to make their optimizing decision in pursuing litigation.
A.

The Data

The CLRP data were generated from surveys of litigants and attorneys
in almost 2,000 cases drawn from federal and state courts and arbitration
bodies in five federal judicial districts, and included many areas of law. All
cases in the data set were terminated between 1977 and 1979. Although
government and private cases were included in the full sample, because
there were so few observations involving government litigants that contained stakes information, I examine only private litigants. Table 1 contains
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summaries about awards and beliefs about the amount at stake (STAKES)
in the full data set and all subsets of it used in this article. ‘‘Full data set’’
refers to the entire CLRP data set, ‘‘Full sample’’ to the most comprehensive sample used in the analysis below (that is, all observations containing
the necessary information), and ‘‘No outright defendant victories’’ to the
full sample without those cases in which the plaintiff received nothing. Recall that in the standard economic model of litigation the existence of trials
and of findings of no liability implies some unpredictability, and a full
measure of the predictability of the judicial process requires that erroneous
expectations of a liability finding be included as well. However, the ‘‘No
outright defendant victories’’ set is included because analysis of those cases
in isolation will be of interest in Subsection C below. ‘‘Judges’’ and ‘‘Juries’’ refer to observations in which the final decision was known to be rendered by those methods. Note that there is significant data attrition in proceeding to the last two sets. This is due to both the inclusion of arbitration
awards in the broadest set and missing information on the manner of adjudication.15
The top portion of Table 1 contains summary information on the entire
data set and the various subsets used here. Note first that there is a distinction between the number of observations and the number of cases. This is
because in some cases information was available for both plaintiffs and defendants, and in some cases there were multiple plaintiffs or defendants.
Each litigant is coded as a separate observation, and the top portion of the
table helps determine the number of cases that made up the larger number
of observations. In addition, the CLRP data were drawn from state and federal courts in five federal judicial districts, and the breakdown of cases between state court, federal court, and alternative-dispute resolution or unknown venue is included.16
The cases of interest are those that proceeded to a final decision rather
than those that were dropped or settled, and so the numbers in Table 1 (with
the exception of the row containing information on the entire data set) refer
to only the former. The lower portion of the table contains information on
means, standard deviations, and maxima and minima for each set, for both
the monetary award of the court, AWARD, and STAKES. These figures are
included to indicate that the judge and jury subsets are not consequentially
15

Data on the manner of adjudication were missing in 111 observations.
The five federal districts from which observations were drawn were two larger urban
districts (Philadelphia, Los Angeles), two smaller urban districts (Milwaukee and Columbia,
S.C.), and one predominantly rural district (New Mexico, with the court located in Albuquerque). In addition, approximately 30 state-court cases in the Philadelphia and Milwaukee districts were taken from the Chester County Court of Common Pleas and the Dodge County
Circuit Court, respectively. Kritzer et al., supra note 13.
16
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different from the broader data sets and, indeed, that the stakes and awards
in all the cases that were not settled are not radically different from all cases
that were originally filed.
Finally, the CLRP data are not, strictly speaking, a random sample of
lawsuits. Lawsuits with stakes under $1,000 were deleted by the data set’s
creators unless there were substantial nonmonetary issues (for example, discrimination) at stake. Very large cases were also deleted, but rather than
delete such cases according to the size of awards as such, Kritzer et al. deleted cases with exceptionally large court records. This led to the exclusion
of 32 cases from federal court and four from the state court in California,
out of 2,582 cases eventually included in the full set. As Table 1 indicates,
the range of both awards and perceived stakes is still quite large in the cases
that remain. In fact, in each case the median is significantly less than the
mean for both AWARD and STAKES, due to the presence of a few very
large cases.
Other exclusion criteria potentially affecting the data set’s representativeness include the need to obtain permission of some survey participants and
a ceiling placed on divorce cases in some jurisdictions, which would otherwise have constituted what Kritzer et al. believed to be an excessive proportion of the data set. Finally, cases in which conflict in civil matters was not
a central part of the dispute, such as uncontested probate cases or deportation proceedings, were not included. Some of these problems are commonplace in survey collection, while others represent choices made by the creators. The data set has nonetheless been widely used in empirical work. Its
full exclusion criteria can be found in the data set’s codebook.17
B. Results for the Comprehensive Set
Figures 1 and 2 depict two scatterplots of AWARD and STAKES. Figure
1 contains all observations with nonzero awards in which each variable is
less than $80,000. The cutoff point is chosen so as to obtain a large number
of observations (N ⫽ 198) while not incorporating a range of cases so large
as to render the diagram uninformative. Figure 2 contains a more focused
examination of those cases in which each variable was less than $5,000 (N
⫽ 84). The rough comovement between the two variables is evident in each
case. The Pearson correlation measure between AWARD and STAKES for
all observations containing both variables is ρ ⫽ 0.54.
Regression analysis allows for a more rigorous assessment. The results
for the broadest sample are presented in the first column of Table 2. It contains an ordinary least-squares regression of AWARD on STAKES and on a
17

Id.

Figure 1.—Observations with nonzero awards in which each variable is less than $80,000

Figure 2.—Examination of those cases in which each variable is less than $5,000
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TABLE 2
Relation between Court Awards and Expectations

Variable
STAKES
TORTS
CONTRACT
FAMILY
PROPERTY
LABOR
PRODUCTS
MALPRAC
INTPROP
FIRM
ARB
PLAINTIFF
ρ
R2
F
p
N

Full Sample
Coefficient

Without Defendant
Victories Coefficient

.166082***
(9.956)
⫺5,387.236519
(⫺1.228)
3,818.419346
(.925)
⫺13,110
(⫺1.541)
8,671.336530
(1.063)
⫺9,610.690156
(⫺1.465)
4,731.010663
(.296)
⫺9,006.644564
(⫺.565)
9,945.367336
(.624)
10,569***
(3.439)
⫺7,809.524516
(⫺1.581)
2,584.470625
(.819)

.174767***
(9.666)
⫺6,438.919332
(⫺1.269)
4,688.076808
(.999)
⫺16,072*
(⫺1.794)
6,410.894721
(.711)
⫺11,496
(⫺1.409)
⫺110.009316
(⫺.007)
⫺11,879
(⫺.710)
6,219.597573
(.372)
12,542***
(3.645)
⫺10,907*
(⫺1.997)
5,135.957196
(1.404)

.46360
.4132
16.024
.0001
256

.56778
.4589
16.266
.0001
216

Note.—ρ is the Pearson correlation coefficient between AWARD and
STAKES. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.
* H 0 is rejected at the 10% level.
*** H 0 is rejected at the .1% level.

series of dummy variables. The variables TORTS, CONTRACT, FAMILY,
PROPERTY, LABOR, PRODUCTS, MALPRAC, and INTPROP take the
value one if the observation was, respectively, a torts, contracts, family-law,
property, labor-law (including discrimination), products-liability, malpractice, or intellectual property case. In this and all subsequent regressions,
these categories make up the bulk of the sample. The variable FIRM is zero
if the attorney is a sole practitioner and one otherwise. FIRM is included to
test whether sole proprietor-entrepreneurs behave differently from larger
law firms. Among the reasons an attorney in the former environment might
act differently in estimating what his client should settle for are different
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agency problems in the two types of legal firms, both among attorneys in
larger firms and between client and attorney in both firm types, or different
abilities to spread risk. The variable ARB is a dummy variable taking the
value one if the case was heard by an arbitration panel and zero if the verdict was rendered by a court. The variable PLAINTIFF is a dummy taking
the value one for all observations in which the STAKES estimate was made
by a plaintiff attorney and zero if the estimate was made by a defendant
attorney.
The model does an excellent job in explaining the variance in awards, as
the adjusted R 2 figure (R 2 ) is 0.41. In addition, stakes are highly significant
(p ⬍ .0001). The proportion of variance in awards explained by variance
in expectations is strongly indicative of the predictability of the court
system. If ‘‘randomness’’ in the awarding of damages is taken to mean
that litigants’ ex ante expectations of what courts will do does not explain
much of what courts actually do, this hypothesis can be conclusively rejected.
It is interesting that none of the case-type dummy variables are statistically significant. A model of stakes estimation as a rational activity implies
that obviously accessible information such as case type would be incorporated in stakes estimation, and the evidence is consistent with this hypothesis. If certain types of cases lead to different patterns of court awards, as is
sometimes claimed, attorneys are evidently aware of these tendencies. Indeed, the deterioration in goodness-of-fit measures when all dummies are
excluded is negligible.18 Even without accounting for differences in the way
the court system adjudicates different case types that are unobservable to
attorneys, the explained variance is almost equal. However, working in a
multilawyer firm has a statistically significant upward effect on the award.
C. Excluding Outright Defendant Victories
It is possible that the results indicate an ability to broadly predict wins
and losses rather than to make a good estimate of the award itself. In order
to test this possibility, I include in the second column of Table 2 the same
regression run on the full sample, less observations in which the plaintiff
received nothing. There were 40 such outright defendant victories in the full
set. When they are excluded, the results are not significantly different. The
correlation coefficient is ρ ⫽ 0.57, and the explained variance in the full
regression is R 2 ⫽ 0.46. The evidence thus indicates that outright defendant
18
The estimated equation when all dummies are excluded is AWARD ⫽ 0.195408
STAKES, with R 2 ⫽ 0.3545 and t ⫽ 11.899 for STAKES ( p ⬍ .0001) and F ⫽ 141.594
( p ⬍ .0001).
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victories are not so contrary to expectations that they significantly increase
the unpredictability of litigation.
D.

Judges and Juries

The United States relies on juries in civil litigation far more than other
industrial democracies. Some critics of the U.S. litigation regime argue that
the use of juries rather than judges to render decisions on liability and the
size of damages is a major source of error. The Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, for example, asserted in a comparative
study of product-liability regimes that ‘‘judges tend to adhere more strictly
to statutory or common law restrictions and, as a consequence, be less
swayed by sympathetic feelings for the injured plaintiff.’’ 19 The fact that
in Ireland, the only other such country to place product-liability adjudication in the hands of juries, damages are six times greater on average than
what British judges award is said to be evidence for the erratic tendencies
of juries.20
The CLRP data were limited in that the number of cases in which the
manner of adjudication as between judge and jury was known is small.
Given the small number of cases of each type, including dummy variables
for case types did not allow for sufficiently reliable hypothesis testing.
Thus, only the stakes variable is included. As Table 3 indicates, the predictability of outcomes is strongly confirmed for cases decided by judges and
juries, even given the modest number of observations. For judges, the correlation coefficient between stakes and court awards is ρ ⫽ 0.58, and the proportion of variance explained is R 2 ⫽ 0.40 for the simple ordinary least
squares estimation.
The results for jury trials are almost indistinguishable from those for
judge trials, with ρ ⫽ 0.50 and R 2 ⫽ 0.35. Even with the small number of
observations, the analysis decisively rejects the hypothesis that jury trials
are largely random events, as litigant expectations actually explain more
than a third of the variance in awards. In addition, contrary to much of the
conventional wisdom, the behavior of judges is not significantly more
predictable than that of juries. In fact, although the number of observations shrinks further when zero awards are deleted, so that point estimates
of coefficients become more hazardous, without them juries become
slightly more predictable than judges. These results are contained in panel
B of Table 3.
19
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Product Liability Rules in
OECD Countries 26 (1995).
20
Id. at 27.
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TABLE 3
Judges and Juries

A. Including outright defendant victories:
ρ
Regression: STAKES
t-statistic
p
R2
F
p
N
B. Without outright defendant victories:
ρ
Regression: STAKES
t-statistic
p
R2
F
p
N

Judges

Juries

.57663
.240278
7.404
⬍.0001
.4022
54.819
⬍.0001
80

.54171
.082648
4.125
⬍.0001
.3481
17.020
⬍.0001
30

.58596
.253939
6.179
⬍.0001
.4216
38.174
⬍.0001
51

.60895
.107618
4.521
⬍.0002
.4580
20.436
⬍.0002
23

The results here provide an interesting companion to those of Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg, who found significant differences in judge
and jury trials, albeit ones that do not agree with public perceptions. By
conducting a simple examination of plaintiff demands and court awards in
judge and jury trials in federal courts, they found that in product-liability
and malpractice cases, plaintiffs win more often in front of judges than juries.21 They argued that this belies the common image of juries that lose
their senses when sympathetic plaintiffs oppose wealthy or powerful defendants. The findings here are complementary, indicating that jury trials are
not more speculative ventures than trials in front of a judge.
In addition, the CLRP data provide additional support for a second empirical result of Clermont and Eisenberg. They speculated that substantial
selection effects are at work in determining what sorts of cases are tried
in front of judges and juries, which is further evidence that the common
assumptions about jury trials outlined above are unwarranted.22 They argue
that the fact that plaintiff win rates in front of judges and juries are different
21
Kevin Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1124 (1992). Their hypothesis testing involved primarily comparisons of means rather than more sophisticated attempts to standardize for differences among
cases.
22
Id.
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at a statistically significant level provides evidence that judge and jury trials
are governed by different rules. The inference they draw is that judges and
juries evaluate evidence and apply the law in consequentially different ways
and litigants incorporate these patterns in deciding whether to go to trial.
The above data provide a way to test whether judge and jury trials are
equivalent processes. The method requires defining the error in attorney
stakes estimates, AWARD ⫺ STAKES. If the observations for error in jury
and judge trials are thought of as separate samples from the pool of all trials, there are two competing hypotheses: that they are two draws from the
same underlying distribution or from two separate distributions. The latter
hypothesis would indicate that there are substantive differences in the way
judges and juries make decisions on damage awards.
The appendix reports the results of testing the null hypotheses that the
samples for judge and jury trials come from populations with identical variances and identical means, under the assumption that the errors are normally distributed. The test statistic for the hypothesis of equal variance
is distributed F with (n 1 ⫺ 1, n 2 ⫺ 1) degrees of freedom, where n 1 and
n 2 are the sizes of the two samples. The results indicate that the hypothesis that the two populations have the same variance is strongly rejected
(p ⬍ .0001). There is thus reason to believe that jury trials do yield different ex post error than judge trials.
Assuming unequal variance, the test statistic for whether the two populations have equal means is distributed t, using the Satterthwaite degrees-offreedom approximation.23 Given unequal variance, the test statistic for the
equal means hypothesis is t ⫽ ⫺1.3606 with approximately 36.5 degrees
of freedom. The chance of observing this value with equal means for judge
and jury trials is above conventional standards of statistical significance
(p ⬍ .1820). The inference is that proportionate mistakes in judge trials
have different dispersion from those in jury trials, but no inference can be
made about the mean of those mistakes. The first result suggests that judge
and jury trials are not governed by the same rules.24
III. Trials and the Economic Model of Litigation
The next task is to examine the extent to which awards reflect the factors
that the economic model of litigation indicates they should. It is possible
23
F. W. Satterthwaite, An Approximate Distribution of Estimates of Variance Components, 2 Biometrics Bull. 110 (1946).
24
Note that because the folded F-statistic is a two-tailed test for the hypothesis of equal
variance in two samples, no inferences can be drawn from the test about which type of trial
generates greater variance in the residual. The only inference that may be drawn is that the
variance in estimation errors by litigants is different in each type of trial.

200

THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

that trials are a highly predictable process even as they perform no useful
economic function. For example, trial awards may be a function of the skill
of the opposing attorneys rather than the evidence and the law. If the trial
skills of the own and opposing attorneys are well known, then those factors
will be incorporated into the information set litigants use to generate an expected trial outcome. However, there is no reason to suppose that such differential skill levels would reflect economically important issues in the dispute.25 Courts might also be known to favor defendants or plaintiffs for
economically irrelevant reasons, such as a desire to redistribute wealth to
more ‘‘deserving’’ parties. In this section, dollar awards are thus measured
against measurable dollar valuations of damages, which in all economic
analysis of lawsuits are relevant in determining what the trial outcome
should be.
A. The Data
The CLRP data contain no measure of actual damage. However, another
litigation set compiled by the Rand Corporation in 1989 and 1990 does. The
data were compiled from state-court tort lawsuits involving nongovernmental litigants in Fairfax County, Virginia.26 The set contains estimates by the
litigants of medical costs and monetary damages suffered from lost or damaged property. Data are also available on court awards for the cases that
proceeded to a verdict. Here I confine the analysis to court cases and ignore
cases that were decided by arbitration panels, as it is court behavior that
draws most of the public policy criticism. The data are not ideal, in that
cases in which claimed damages exceeded $35,000 were excluded from the
survey. Some of the criticism of the litigation regime’s unreliability involves large damages, including punitive damages. However, it is tort litigation, especially products-liability litigation, that is most often assailed by
critics.27 Since large damages are said to be costly primarily because they
are unpredictable rather than because they are large per se,28 the analysis
in Section II, in which awards had a much greater range, addressed this
objection.

25
One could argue that the most worthy cases attract the best advocates, but there is no
evidence on this proposition. It is also plausible that high-skill attorneys enjoy challenges
and are thus drawn to long-shot cases.
26
Allen A. Lind et al., Survey of Tort Litigants in Three State Courts, 1989–1990: United
States (1992).
27
McGuire, supra note 1.
28
Id.
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Methodology

Several types of cases were included in the Rand data set. The questionnaire asked respondents to classify the suit as a motor vehicle accident,
other accident or injury, property damage or loss, assault (and battery), false
arrest or imprisonment, fraud or false representation, or slander, libel, or
other defamation. Wrongful-death cases were excluded from the original
sample, so there are no confounding effects from the difficulties of calculating the value of human life. The variety of different types of torts means
that the measurable proxies for economic loss are different from case to
case. For example, in some cases damage to property is the relevant measure of such loss, while in others the replacement value of the property may
be more appropriate. In some cases there are medical expenses, in others,
damages against assets that are harder to precisely value, such as reputation.
Given the modest number of observations, it would not have been possible
to conduct testing on each category of damage because the number of cases
of each type would have been too small.
Thus, the approach taken is to obtain a total estimate for damages that is
the sum of all possible types of damage found in the various types of litigation in the survey. When a particular type of damage (such as medical expenses) is not relevant for the observation in question, that measure takes
the value zero. The estimations thus employ the variable DAMAGE, which
is defined as
DAMAGE ⫽ MEDEXPPR ⫹ MEDEXPFU
⫹ max{PROPDMGE, REPLVAL} ⫹ OTHER.

(1)

The variable MEDEXPPR represents any medical expenses already incurred as the result of the dispute-generating incident, MEDEXPFU is anticipated future medical expenses, PROPDMGE is the cost of repairing
property, REPLVAL is the cost to replace destroyed property, and OTHER
is any other expenses that plaintiff incurred (excluding costs of the litigation
itself) as a consequence of the incident. Almost all observations concerning
property damage contained information on either the replacement value of
the property or property damage, but not both. For the small number that
contained both figures, (1) indicates that the larger value was used. The
components of DAMAGE are all taken from plaintiffs’ responses to questions about various explicit monetary costs incurred as a result of the incident. The model was tested both with and without subtracting insurance rebates from the total damage calculation, and in each case the best fit was
obtained by using gross rather than net damages. Gross damages are thus
employed in the results reported here. Finally, while in Section II predict-
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ability was the issue and zero awards were thus of interest, here the issue
of interest is the extent to which awarded damages reflect economic damages. Thus, observations with awards of zero were deleted, but observations
with any positive awards, even ‘‘ceremonial’’ awards such as $1, were included.
C.

Results

The regression was conducted on DAMAGE and JUDGE, which is a
dummy variable taking the value of one if the verdict was rendered by a
judge and zero if it was rendered by a jury. The estimated equation is
AWARD ⫽ 0.043391 DAMAGE ⫹ 5,871.980567 JUDGE.
(3.515)
(1.079)

(2)

The damages proxy is significant at the 0.1 percent level, while JUDGE
is not significant ( p ⬍ .29). One null hypothesis, of all zero coefficients, is
conclusively rejected (F ⫽ 13.582, p ⬍ .001). Another null hypothesis, that
the manner of adjudication is irrelevant to the economic accuracy of courts,
cannot be rejected. Most important, the measurable damages to property
and body explain a significant amount of the variance in awards (R 2 ⫽
0.21). This figure is impressive for a modest cross-sectional sample, given
that there were some economically important damages that were not included in the data and that there was no attempt in the survey from which
the data were compiled to discriminate between compensatory and punitive
damages. Perhaps the most obvious example of economically relevant damages not included in the data is the value of lost work time. Despite this,
over 20 percent of the variance in awards is explained simply by measuring
variance in medical expenses and property damage.
Because of the small number of observations (N ⫽ 46), the precision of
the point estimates is hardly definitive. However, even with this small sample size, the results indicate that, when awards are made, economic considerations make significant contributions to the size of awards. At the same
time, other factors may come into play, as the amount of unexplained variance in this sample, some of which is attributable to unmeasured economic
damage, is still high. However, at least at the level of the ordinary, gardenvariety tort lawsuit, the justice system seems to a significant degree to be
accomplishing what the economic analysis of law indicates it should.
IV. Concluding Remarks
This article set out to examine the ability of the U.S. court system to
carry out a consistent, economically sound pattern of judgment. The findings cast doubt on several widely held beliefs about the nature of civil liti-
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gation in the United States. Court awards are a highly predictable process,
a result that is robust with respect to verdicts rendered by juries and judges.
As for the economic utility of this process, the results are somewhat more
tentative in terms of precision but nonetheless persuasive as a matter of
overall hypothesis testing. Economically relevant costs such as medical expenses and property damage explain a significant proportion of the variance
in court awards.
Regardless of the extent to which economically important factors determine court awards, attorneys, who are the firms employed by the litigants
who must decide on the disposition of lawsuits, seem to be able to substantially anticipate how courts dispense those awards. To the extent that wildcard juries or attorney skill are important in determining awards, attorneys
are evidently aware of how these considerations matter, since the awards
themselves are significantly predictable. This reliability may explain the
well-known fact that nearly all lawsuits that are filed do not proceed to a
verdict.
In addition, evidence was found to support the hypothesis that judge trials and jury trials do operate under different yet understandable rules. The
dispersion of the estimation error of litigants and their attorneys was distributed differently for each type of trial. This evidence supports earlier findings that the two types of trials are different, and this article was able to
demonstrate that in each case attorneys are in large measure able to ascertain these differences. The exact nature of these differences has not been
investigated empirically, which would be an interesting direction for future
research.
The findings, while noteworthy, contain some omissions that it would be
useful to account for in further research. Most important, the data on economically relevant factors in damage calculation did not contain information on many of these factors, most obviously loss of pay. In addition, because the data deleted some larger awards, the examination of data
containing such awards would be an important step in further examination
of the economic efficiency of trials.
APPENDIX
Differences in Error Distribution, Judge and Jury Trials
Judge trials: µ ⫽ ⫺19,224.537500, σ ⫽ 76,328.96982.
Jury trials: µ ⫽ ⫺54,128.866667, σ ⫽ 132,511.69787.
Equality of error variance: H 0 (equal variance): F(29, 79) ⫽ 3.01 ( p ⬍ 0.0001).
Equality of error means: H 0 (equal means, given unequal variance): t(36.5) ⫽
1.3606 (p ⬍ 0.1820).

